Can Moral Statements Be True? Part Two [essay]

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As I wrote Part One of this thought piece, it began to dawn on me that what I was doing was looking for moral standards to guide my own behavior.

I tried several approaches to answering this question: Can moral statements be true (or false, for that matter)? I concluded that one cannot corroborate or contradict statements like these:

• Profiting from the suffering of others is wrong
• Telling the truth is right
• Treating others fairly is moral
• Failing to abide by agreements you have voluntarily made is immoral
• Kindness to others is good
• Greed is bad
• You should not take credit for the accomplishments of others
• You should take responsibility for your own actions

and so on, and so forth.

Facts are not enough alone to prove whether or not such moral statements are true or false.

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Now here's another approach: What if all the world's religions, at all times throughout human history, agreed that a certain behavior is good and its opposite is bad? If all religious traditions were in favor of this good behavior and opposed to its opposite, wouldn't such enduring and extensive accord be a sufficient basis for saying this behavior is good in fact and its opposite bad?

Well...No. That would be like saying, All believers in an almighty and all-knowing deity have agreed about that God's moral standards, so therefore moral statements deriving from these standards are "true." But - for one thing -  we know there are people who do not believe in any supernatural being. Can we truly say that atheists - by definition - are immoral?

One would think we cannot. The most one could credibly claim is that all atheists are spiritually deficient, not morally flawed; that is, their beliefs may be lacking, by definition, but their behavior might still be moral, which is a social and behavioral concept rather than an intellectual or spiritual one.

It is correct that some people (including even, we have to note, some believers) behave as if they did not hold themselves to any moral standard, implying that for them, no morality exists at all. If atheists were logically consistent, would they all be amoral in this way?

In other words, is this a true statement: "It is immoral (or amoral) not to worship God"?

I don't see how we can reasonably hold this position. One could, for instance, rigorously follow a "moral code" just because he or she thinks that's the right thing to do, even though nothing in the world around us and nothing supernatural makes its moral statements true.

Claiming that a statement deriving from a moral standard accepted by all religions is true, would not be unlike saying that in this state or that state, a certain behavior is legal. Being legal, though, as we know, is not the same thing as being moral. The mere fact that a majority of all the world's people, throughout all history, may have thought it moral or immoral to do a particular thing is no guarantee that this claim is not mistaken: truth is not determined by a vote, even if the vote is unanimous. (Wide agreement would make a moral principle important, but not "true.")

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Maybe it's worth pointing out that there are facts that are relevant to moral statements. People living in a society where individuals routinely act unselfishly might be shown to be less inclined toward political upheaval than others, for example, or to feel more loyal to their employers, or even to live longer. Any of those matters of fact, if they should exist, would show us that unselfishness was beneficial to society in certain measurable ways. But they would not make the statement "Selfishness is bad" true, only useful.

Some say - as another example - that it is immoral to bring into the world an infant when it is virtually certain that the mother cannot provide for the child's well-being. In such an instance, the facts demonstrating this high probability are relevant to the moral question of artificial birth control. But they don't prove that "Birth control is good" is a true (or a false) statement - not good or bad, only rational.

Although facts are or may be relevant to moral issues, that is, they are not determinative in themselves of "moral truth."

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So, then: expressions about right and wrong can be neither corroborated nor contradicted by facts, and there is no independent or absolute moral standard that can be used to prove the truth or falsity of a moral claim.

When we say -

• Torture is wrong, or
• Having sex with someone else's spouse is immoral, or
• Treating people badly just because they are different from you is wrong, or
• Showing respect for other people even when they disagree with you is good, or
• Justice is better than revenge -

when we make such claims, we are saying that we like or don't like the matters identified; we admire justice and showing respect even for those who disagree with us, and we deplore revenge and adultery. Statements about what a person's moral judgements are may be true or false, but it would not be "true or false" to say that seeking revenge - for example - is immoral, only that the individual thinks so.

But that seems disappointing, doesn't it? We don't feel it is enough to say, "I admire unselfishness and I despise greed," or "I would not harm others if I could avoid it and I will always tell the truth." (Why should someone else care what our moral principles are anyway, anymore than our preferences in pop music or classical literature?)

Saying merely, "I believe all people should be treated fairly" or "I despise those who exploit the ill fortune of others" - seems to reduce important moral statements to the level of "I like broccoli" and "Opera bores me." I can make the claim, "It is immoral to want for myself something I deny to someone else," but in doing so I am only expressing an opinion, rather than accurately describing the world ... and this seems less momentous.

It just seems these days that expressing an opinion is less significant than explaining what is or is not factual. What I think, we seem to feel, is less compelling than what I know. My personal values are considered less consequential than my understanding of people and things outside myself. 

Moral values cannot be proven either true nor false, which makes them seem trivial.

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Now, to recall the sage observation of that preacher in my sixth grade class, is there any kind of "truth" we can credibly claim for moral statements?   Dr. Smith - I assume - was speaking of the Bible's truth as being sometimes and in some ways that kind of truth one finds in myths, which to many of us do seem to accurately describe human nature and human hopes and dreams, truths - that is - which correspond to such a comprehensive reality that to limit their reference to mere matters of easily observable facts would be to miss their point and misunderstand them.

Because of the complexity and comprehensiveness of their reference, statements of this kind of "truth" may not be subject to corroboration or contradiction but may still be considered true or false.  Might we find a truth or falsity of a similar kind in moral statements?

And if so, would morality seem more important to us? Well, since we in our times don't respect mythology very much - even sometimes using the term "myth" to mean "lies" - this approach seems interesting (since moral claims, like myths, refer comprehensively to all people at all times) but not the compelling solution we are looking for.

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We can make true (or false) claims about moral statements, like these -

• Treating others fairly is beneficial to all society, or
• If everyone sought to profit from the suffering of others, many would be harmed, or
• Pursuit of riches is not deeply satisfying long-term, or
• Torture does not reliably produce accurate testimony, or
• It is unwise to think you are more important than others.

These are complex and comprehensive statements - about wisdom, happiness, what benefits society, and such - and it is conceivable that enough experience or observation or historical research would prove or tend to prove their truth or falsity.

But is it right to be efficient, humble, happy, or socially beneficial?  How could we know, for sure? 

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Let's get back to moral statements, not statements about the efficiency or practical value of certain behaviors but moral statements like these:

• Punishing an individual for the wrong-doing of his or her ancestors is wrong, or
• Honoring the individual who behaves morally even in trying circumstances is good, or
• It is bad for a society to deny equal opportunity to every one of its members, or
• It is right for political leaders to work together to promote the general welfare,

and so on -

Rather than seeking to show how these and other similar moral values are based on divine authority, or widespread agreement, or on reality itself, why can't a person just be satisfied by convincing himself or herself that X is right and Y is wrong, or that A is good and B is bad, or one should do this and should not do that? 

It is true there will be differences of opinion about such statements; so for us to live productively and amicably together, we need to find ways we can use to show why or why not to accept the value of guiding our behavior by one or by groups of such moral statements. 

In other words, the greater good for all will be achieved more readily the higher the degree to which all of us are willing to guide our behavior on the basis of the principle that Treating others as we would want them to treat us is good, and Behaving selfishly is bad, and It is immoral to profit from the suffering of others, and It is moral to take responsibility for one's own actions (and so on).  The more we can approach agreement on what is moral and what is not - not on the basis of claimed divine authority, not on a claim that one value is true and another is false, and not primarily on the basis of practical utility - but simply because we think it is right. The sooner we reach that point, the better for us all.

What can be brought to a discussion about whether or not is it right to seek to deny to someone else what you wish to have yourself (for example)?  How could we explain why we think greed is immoral and lying is bad? And so on.  What's relevant?

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The relevant facts about the moral guide - when it is possible to learn them - are worth knowing, although they will not prove the validity or invalidity of the moral statement.  For instance, whether we consider capital punishment morally tolerable or morally repugnant, we should be interested to learn whether having execution as a possible judicial sentence does or does not tend to deter murderers from their heinous crimes. 

Maybe we would learn conclusively that capital punishment does work as a deterrent.   Maybe we would learn than it does not serve as a deterrent.  But, either way, such a fact would be worth considering in forming our moral judgement.

Another thing to be brought to the discussion about a moral issue - I'm tempted to think the most important thing - is the question of consistency with our other moral principles. 

Complex moral questions often involve prioritizing what's at stake in a certain situation.  Maintaining public safety, for example, is a good thing, even though it's good for practical rather than essentially moral reasons; but is it a high enough value to justify killing someone, as in capital punishment, when respecting others' right to live is an elemental moral value?  Is the virtue of punishing someone in proportion to her or his crime high enough to justify execution?  Regardless of what we eventually decide, these are issues that should be weighed for consistency in our value system.  Finally, let's say we know for sure it is good and moral to treat others as we would want to be treated ourselves, so can I honestly say that if I had betrayed my country, I would want to be executed for my treason?  If my morality were logically consistent, I would.

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We can't know what's right and wrong from studying only the relevant facts.  We can't know for sure from learning the moral codes that have traditionally been accepted by others.  We might know the probable practical benefits and drawbacks from various feelings and behaviors from our own experience, our own observation, and our own reasoning.  But even all of these together (and other steps others may propose) will not guarantee that X is right and Y is wrong.  We have to decide that for ourselves, understanding that we would want others to make their own decisions.

And unlike my freshman classmate, we should always be aware that our moral decisions are not trivial (or "arbitrary"), despite their coming essentially from within, like our taste in pop music.

We cannot consider moral statements true, or false.  But we make moral choices all the time, daily and long-term.  Why, then, don't I adopt a strategy?  Why don"t I behave as though I knew the moral truths I need in order to live responsibly?

So, here's what I'm going to do.  From this point on, I will -

• Set a higher standard for myself than I would judge others by
• Treat others as I want others to treat me
• Judge my actions and those of others on moral values consistent with my other moral values
• Seek peace and prosperity, equal opportunity, liberty and justice for all
• Respect others' opinions even when I disagree with them
• Avoid any attempt to impose on others my values or my world view
• Not deny to others things I want for myself
• Tell the truth (except in those few instances when to do so would be contrary to other essential values)
• Work against any attempt to profit from the suffering of others
• Take responsibility for my actions
• Do what I say I will do, or explain why
• Not treat those different from me as though, by being different, they were inferior
• Support political leaders who believe they should work together with others to serve the general social good, and
• Add to this list, never considering it complete or finished.

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